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first was no defense inasmuch as the income executions specified two
different employers.
ARTICLE 75

-

ARBITRATON

CPLR 7502(b): Court refers time-limitations objection to arbitrator.
In City of Auburn v. Nash'4 ' the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, was called upon to determine whether it is the arbitrator or
the court who should decide an objection addressed to the timeliness of
a demand for arbitration. The case arose under a collective bargaining
agreement involving city employees. Special term found that although
the employee had fully complied with the prescribed grievance procedures, a substantial issue was presented regarding the timeliness of
the employee's demand for arbitration. Accordingly, an order was
entered which permanently stayed the arbitration.
The appellate division reversed on the ground that questions of
"procedural arbitrability" are properly decided by the arbitrator. The
court compared the contract before it with one wherein compliance
with time limitations is made a condition precedent to arbitration and
concluded that, in the latter instance, the issue of timeliness is for the
courts;

142

whereas in the former circumstance the issue is for the arbi-

trators. 143

As support for this proposition the court pointed to the presumption of arbitrability in labor arbitration cases, 144 particularly when
no language evidencing a contrary intent is discernible.
In reaching this conclusion no mention was made of CPLR 7502
(b).145 This section concerns statutes of limitations and reasonable time
limitations which are created by contracting parties. 146 In either instance, the issue of compliance with a time limitation is deemed a
"threshold" question 147 to be decided by the court. As such, the petitioner who makes a timely application for a stay of arbitration is
entitled to judicial review. Moreover, a preliminary determination regarding the proper forum in which to decide the issue is of critical importance inasmuch as a court's determination that the arbitration is
14134 App. Div. 2d 345, 312 N.Y.S.2d 700 (4th Dep't 1970).
142 Id. at 347, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 702, citing Matter of Bd. of Educ. (Heckler Elec. Co.), 7
N.Y.2d 476, 166 N.E.2d 666, 199 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1960).
143 34 App. Div. 2d at 347, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 702, citing Long Island Lumber Co. v. Martin, 15 N.Y.2d 380, 207 N.E.2d 190, 259 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1965).
144 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 7503, supp. commentary at 136 (1966).
the claim sought to be arbitrated would have been
145 CPLR 7502(b) provides: "If...
barred by limitation of time had it been asserted in a court of the state, a party may assert the limitation. .. to the court ....

"

146 CPLR 201; see River Brand Rice Mills, Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 305 N.Y. 36,
110 N.E.2d 545 (1953).
147 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 7503, commentary at 488 (1963).
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not time-barred is appealable, 148 whereas a similar conclusion by the
arbitrator is not reviewable. 149
The outcome in City of Auburn cannot be explained solely on the
ground that there is a presumption of arbitrability in labor arbitration
cases. A result similar to City of Auburn issued in In re Textiles,
Inc.,150 a commercial arbitration case. The only distinction between the
cases is that the Textiles court relied on the freedom of contracting parties to choose a forum in which to settle their disputes.'5 l Furthermore,
although it is often stated that there is a vast difference between commercial arbitration and labor arbitration, 1 2 the differences do not appear so pronounced under the CPLR.153 In fact, as between Textiles
and City of Auburn it is the former which presents better arguments for
permitting the arbitrator to decide the time objection since in Textiles
difficult questions requiring a precise knowledge of the textile industry
were presented. Thus, an experienced arbitrator was in a better position
to determine whether certain defects in the materials had been discovered and objected to within a reasonable time.
The conclusion, therefore, is that in both commercial and labor
arbitration cases the issue of timeliness of a demand for arbitration has
been referred to the arbitrator. Such a result is supportable for at least
four reasons. First, although the time-limitation objection is deemed a
"threshold" one, it may also be raised before the arbitrator should the
parties so choose.16 4 Thus, there is no legislative mandate that the objection must always be decided by a court. This observation is fortified
by the second ground in favor of City of Auburn: the issue raised does
not involve public policy and there is no practical reason why the arbi148 See 8 WK&M
7502.08.
149 See CPLR 7511; see also 8 WK&M
7502.12.
150 164 N.Y.L.J. 18, July 27, 1970, at 2, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), discussed in
The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 342, 367-69 (1970).
151 See Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353
(1961).
152 See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 578 (1960): "In the commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation,
[in labor cases] arbitration is the substitute for industrial strife .... Arbitration of labor
disputes has quite different functions from arbitration under an ordinary commercial
agreement."
153 See 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 7503, supp. commentary at 136 (1966). For example, it
was the law that a party could defeat arbitration by demonstrating that there was no
"bona fide" dispute. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 297 N.Y.
519,74 N.E.2d 464 (1947). Such reasoning was dispelled in labor arbitration cases inasmuch
as "[t]he agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely those that a
court may deem to be meritorious." United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960). Nonetheless, when the CPLR was enacted, it abrogated the
Cutler-Hammer doctrine in all types of arbitration cases. 8 WK&M
7501.
154 It should be noted, however, that CPLR 7502(b) permits the arbitrator to refuse

to decide the limitations issue.
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trator should not be allowed to decide it. 155 Third, the arbitrator's experience in a particular field makes him better able to rule on technical
issues than the court. Finally, City of Auburn relieves the court of its
duty to determine threshold questions and, as a calendar-clearing device, is much more palatable than an oppressive ten-day statute of limitations. 156 Nonetheless, the legislature has identified the time-limitations
objection as a threshold one to be decided by the courts upon a timely
application for a stay of arbitration. Particularly in view of the variance
in scope of review between the court's decision and the abritrator's determination, CPLR 7502(b) should not be abrogated by judicial fiat.
CPLR 7503(c): Nonsignatory of arbitrationagreement is not precluded
by the failure to apply for a stay of arbitrationwithin ten days.
The recipient of a properly drafted' 57 notice of intention to arbi58
in
trate will be foreclosed from raising certain threshold questions
16°
59
days.
ten
within
arbitration
of
stay
a
for
he
applies
unless
court
61
This ten-day period has been construed as a statute of limitations. '
Such an interpretation is onerous when applied to a signatory of an
arbitration agreement; if applied to a nonsignatory it would be even
by the Appellate Dimore oppressive. This was the conclusion reached
1 62
Price.
v.
Glasser
in
vision, Second Department,
The petitioners entered into a leasing agreement with the individual respondents, Price, Kligher and Tobin. The contract contained a
clause whereby the parties agreed to arbitrate any and all disputes
arising thereunder. Respondent, Premier Estate Planners, Inc. (Premier), which was not a party to the leasing agreement, notified peti237 N.E.2d
'55 Cf. Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prods., Inc., 21 N.Y.2a 621,
223, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1968); Agur v. Agur, 32 App. Div. 2d 16, 298 N.Y.S.2d 772 (2d
Dep't 1969).
156 CPLR 7503(c), as construed in Jonathan Logan, Inc. v. Stillwater Worsted Mills,
Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 898, 249 N.E2d 477, 301 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1969).
157 The notice of intention to arbitrate must contain the name and address of the
claimant and must specify the agreement pursuant to which arbitration is sought. Also,
notice must be given the recipient that unless an application is made within ten days
after such service, he will be precluded from raising the "threshold questions." CPLR
7503(c).
158 Under CPLR 7503(c) the threshold questions are: (1) whether a valid agreement
to arbitrate was made; (2) whether it was complied with; (3) whether the claim sought
to be arbitrated is barred by a limitation of time.
159 The recipient may nonetheless present before the arbitrator the objection that
the arbitration is barred by a limitation of time. However, the latter may refuse to
consider it. CPLR 7502(b).
160 CPLR 7503(c).
161 Jonathan Logan, Inc. v. Stillwater Worsted Mills, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 898, 249 N.E.2d
477, 301 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1969), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REv.
758, 760 (1970).
102 35 App. Div. 2d 98, 313 N.Y.S.2d I (2d Dep't 1970).

